The staff running college athletics are up against a new set of challenges.

There is a version of the House v. NCAA settlement story that reads as a triumphant moment — student-athletes finally compensated, amateurism exposed for the legal fiction it always was, and a more honest economic model taking shape. That version isn't wrong. But for the men and women running athletic departments across the country, the story looks considerably more complicated from the inside.
What went into effect on July 1, 2025 wasn't just a legal resolution. It was a financial restructuring of college athletics — one that landed squarely on the desks of athletics directors and their staffs without a clear playbook, without new revenue already in hand, and without any grace period to figure it out.
The pressure is real, it is immediate, and it is not going away.
When Judge Claudia Wilken approved the House settlement in June 2025, she set into motion a 10-year revenue-sharing model that allows Division I institutions to distribute up to $20.5 million directly to student-athletes in the 2025–2026 academic year alone. That cap is set to increase by roughly 4% annually and is projected to reach approximately $33 million by 2035.
For Power Four programs that opted in automatically, this wasn't optional. It was a mandate. And for the 82% of Division I schools — some 319 programs — that chose to opt in as well, it was a decision made in the spirit of competitive necessity, even when the financial foundation to support it wasn't entirely in place.
As Pitt Athletic Director Allen Greene put it plainly: "We have a new line item of $20.5 million." His department responded by reducing expenses, holding open positions, and accelerating philanthropic fundraising. Pitt Athletics reported its most successful fundraising year on record in 2025, generating more than $19.9 million in total cash contributions. Greene called it a "strategic" approach. What he was really describing was triage.
This is the quiet reality most athletics directors are navigating: the money has to come from somewhere, and right now, "somewhere" means fundraising harder, cutting smarter, and hoping the revenue side keeps pace with the obligation.
One of the less-discussed dimensions of the post-House landscape is how differently it hits depending on where you sit in the Division I ecosystem.
The Knight Commission's analysis made the disparity stark: the median revenue for institutions in the Power Four conferences is approximately $145 million — roughly $100 million more than the median for other FBS programs, and $125 million more than other Division I subdivisions. When everyone is operating under the same $20.5 million revenue-sharing cap, the schools that generate more revenue absorb it more easily. For everyone else, it's a different equation entirely.
For programs in conferences like the MAC or the Horizon League, athletic budgets are already stretched thin — in some cases, under $60 million total. Kent State Athletic Director Randale Richmond described his department's $56 million budget as less than a third the size of Power Four counterparts, and noted that the gap between mid-majors and the sport's financial giants has never been wider.
Meanwhile, the informal market hasn't slowed down. Third-party NIL deals — those struck between boosters, collectives, or corporate partners and athletes — don't count against the revenue-sharing cap. This has created a shadow economy running parallel to the official one. As Notre Dame Athletics Director Pete Bevacqua observed bluntly: "The numbers you're hearing and the numbers we know that are out there don't compute with the cap number." Schools with deep-pocketed boosters, like Texas Tech — which reportedly spent more than $28 million on its football roster in the 2025–2026 season — operate in a different competitive environment than programs counting on a $1 million annual media rights check to fund their operations.
For mid-majors, this isn't just a financial problem. It's a talent pipeline problem. Programs are increasingly acting as development grounds for Power Four rosters, watching their most competitive underclassmen leave via the transfer portal before they can build anything sustainable.
Athletics departments have always fundraised. But what's changed is the nature of that obligation. Historically, major gifts supported facilities, scholarship endowments, and program enhancements — capital investments that donors could see and celebrate. Now, a meaningful portion of every dollar raised is flowing directly to athlete compensation. It is an operational expense dressed in the language of generosity.
This creates real friction in donor conversations. Athletics development staff are being asked to grow their donor bases, increase giving levels, and sustain momentum — all while the story they're telling is more complicated than it used to be. How do you steward a gift that goes to revenue sharing? How do you create naming rights or recognition opportunities around what is essentially payroll? These aren't rhetorical questions. They are conversations happening in development offices right now.
At the same time, departments are under pressure to grow non-traditional revenue streams: corporate sponsorships, media rights negotiations, premium seating packages, conference realignment opportunities, and — increasingly — private equity partnerships. Some programs and conferences have already begun exploring private capital as a mechanism to bridge the gap between what they generate and what the new model demands.
The administrative burden compounds all of this. Managing NIL deal compliance through the Deloitte-run NIL Go clearinghouse, navigating Title IX implications of how revenue sharing is distributed across men's and women's sports, absorbing back-pay damage assessments that will reduce future NCAA distributions from events like the NCAA Tournament — these are not small operational lifts. They require legal counsel, compliance infrastructure, and staff capacity that most departments weren't built to support at this scale.
It's worth stating plainly what gets lost in the policy discussions: this environment is exhausting for the people doing the work.
Athletics directors are being asked to be chief executives, chief fundraisers, policy experts, and talent strategists simultaneously — often without proportional increases in staff or resources. Senior development staff are working harder to close gifts in an environment where donor fatigue is a real concern and where the return on giving is harder to articulate. Compliance offices are operating under new regulatory frameworks that are still being interpreted in real time.
The College Sports Commission, the new enforcement body created under the settlement, is still establishing its operational norms. The rules governing what counts against the cap, how third-party NIL deals are evaluated, and how Title IX applies to revenue-sharing distributions remain unsettled in meaningful ways. Athletics staff are being asked to comply with rules that haven't been fully written yet.
This is not a sustainable pace. And for programs operating outside the revenue-rich tier of college athletics, it raises a serious question: what does it mean to compete in Division I in this environment?
None of this is an argument against the settlement or the principle behind it. Student-athletes generating the revenue that funds multi-million dollar coaching salaries and facility renovations deserved to share in what they built. That argument was always sound.
But acknowledging that the outcome is just doesn't resolve the operational challenge it creates. Athletics directors need something more than a mandate — they need strategy.
A few things seem clear from how programs are beginning to adapt:
Revenue diversification is no longer optional. Departments that rely heavily on a single revenue driver — ticket sales, a single major donor, conference distributions — are the most exposed. Building a more diversified revenue base across media, corporate sponsorships, premium experiences, and community engagement isn't a long-term goal anymore. It is a present-tense survival strategy.
The development operation has to evolve. The programs that are navigating this transition most effectively are the ones that have invested in their fundraising infrastructure — expanding donor bases, professionalizing stewardship, and building the case for giving in language that resonates with the post-House moment. Pitt's record fundraising year didn't happen by accident. It happened because the department made a deliberate pivot.
Community and identity matter more now, not less. At mid-major programs especially, the traditional levers of competitive success are harder to pull when the transfer portal empties your roster every spring. What remains — and what can be cultivated — is a genuine connection between the program, the institution, and the community it serves. Donors who feel that connection don't just give; they give repeatedly, and they bring others along.
Clarity is a competitive advantage. In a landscape full of uncertainty, athletic directors who can articulate a clear, honest vision for their program's financial model and competitive identity will be better positioned to lead their staffs, build donor trust, and make the hard decisions that this environment demands.
The House settlement changed the rules of college athletics. The institutions that will navigate this era most successfully won't be the ones that simply spend more — they'll be the ones that think more clearly about what they're building, who they're building it for, and what it will take to sustain it.
That work begins with an honest accounting of where things stand. The new math of college athletics is hard. But it is knowable. And the athletics leaders who get their arms around it first will be better positioned to lead in an era that has permanently redefined what the job requires.
